This paper revisits the relationship between interest rates and house prices. Surveying a number of recent studies and bringing to bear some new evidence on the question, this paper argues that in the data, the impact of interest rates on house prices appears to be quite modest. Specifically, the estimated effects are uniformly smaller than those implied by the conventional user cost theory of house prices, and they are too small to explain the previous decade's real estate boom in the U.S. and elsewhere. However in some countries, there does appear to have been a link between the rapid expansion of the monetary base and growth in house prices and housing credit.
Introduction
The relationship between interest rates and property prices has come under intense scrutiny since the housing boom of the mid-2000s, and the ensuing financial crisis of 2007-09. Two views have emerged from this experience. One is that monetary policy should respond more proactively to asset price rises, and especially to excesses in the property markets. According to this view, by "leaning against the wind" central banks can prevent or attenuate asset price bubbles, and thus promote financial stability. This would represent a retreat from the Bernanke-Gertler (1999) dictum that monetary policy should respond only to the macroeconomic consequences of asset price fluctuations, rather than to asset prices themselves. 1 A second, stronger view is that overly expansionary monetary policy is itself the cause of asset price bubbles, and in particular that the Federal Reserve deserves blame for the recent house price bubble. Taylor (2007 Taylor ( , 2009 ) has forcefully articulated this view, which often surfaces in the financial press as well. If so, then monetary policymakers need to be extremely cautious about pursuing expansionary monetary policy, lest it eventually precipitate a financial crisis.
Both of these views rest on the hypothesis that interest rates have an economically significant effect on real estate prices. The validity of that hypothesis may appear self evident at first glance.
Historically, interest rates declines do tend to precede periods of house price appreciation, and that was certainly true over the last decade. A more careful examination of the data yields little support for this hypothesis, however. Surveying a number of recent studies and bringing to bear some new evidence on the question, this paper argues that in the data, the impact of interest rates on house prices appears to be quite modest. In fact, the estimated effects are uniformly smaller than those implied by the conventional user cost theory of house prices, and insufficient to account for the rapid house price appreciation experienced in the U.S. and elsewhere.
A link between low interest rates and house price bubbles is especially tenuous. Standard theory says that low interest rates should increase house values (or the the value of any long-lived asset, for that matter). Consequently, the observation that house prices rise when interests rates fall is not by itself evidence that low interest rates cause bubbles. To make this case, one would have to argue house prices tend to overreact to interest rate reductions, i.e., that appreciations are larger than warranted by fundamentals. The generally muted response observed in the data suggests this is not the case.
The paper begins with a review of the ways in which interest rates can affect house prices, focusing primarily on the conventional user cost model. It goes on from there to survey some of the existing evidence on the relationship between interest rates and house prices. It then presents two new sets of empirical findings. One is an error correction model involving U.S. data on house 1 See Kuttner (2011a) for a survey of the arguments for and against this view. prices, rents, and the long-term interest rate. The second is a cross-country exploration of the relationships between interest rates, the monetary base, house prices, and housing credit. Both confirm that the effect of interest rates on property prices is small. However in some countries, there does appear to be a link between monetary factors -the monetary base in particular -and the property market.
Why interest rates affect house prices
This section reviews the channels through which interest rates affect house prices. While it breaks no new ground theoretically, such a review is useful for two reasons. One is that it gives some structure to discussions as to what constitutes a bubble, as opposed to the normal inverse relationship between interest rates and property pries. A second is that it provides a metric for assessing the economic and quantitative significance of empirical estimates of interest rates' impact on property prices.
The user cost framework
A natural starting point for analyzing the connection between interest rates and property prices is the venerable user cost model which, as argued by Himmelberg et al. (2005) , provides a useful benchmark for gauging the importance of economic fundamentals. The model is based on the simple proposition that market forces should equate the cost of renting with the all-in risk-adjusted cost of home ownership. The equality is expressed as
where R/P is the rent-to-price ratio, i is the relevant nominal long-term interest rate, δ is the rate of physical depreciation, σ is the risk premium associated with owning a home, andṖ e /P is expected nominal house price appreciation. The property and income tax rates, τ p and τ y , also figure into the calculation, as in Poterba (1984) . Equivalently, subtracting the expected rate of inflation π e yields an expression in terms of the real interest rate and the rate of real house price appreciation,
where the term in square brackets represents the real user cost, excluding expected real house price appreciation. While obvious at some level, an important and often overlooked point is that the interest rate is one of the economic fundamentals underlying property prices. One does not need to appeal to bubbles to explain why interest rate cuts lead to higher property prices.
The quantitative effects of interest rate changes are easily calculated by differentiating equation
where UC is the right-hand side of equation 1. Historical values of real user cost (UC) and τ y can be used to obtain a rough estimate of this sensitivity. With the mortgage rate in the 7% range (where it was in the late 1990s) δ = 1.3%, τ p = 1.2%, τ y = 21% and expected 10-year consumer price inflation of 2%, real UC would have been roughly 6%, ignoring the risk premium and assuming zero expected real appreciation. As mortgage rates (and other long-term interest rates) fell in the early 2000s, real UC declined to approximately 5%. With real UC equal to 6%, equation 3 implies that a 10 basis point reduction in the mortgage rate would lead to a 1.3% increase in house prices;
with real UC equal to 5%, the implied increase is 1.6%.
Naturally, this calculation is sensitive to assumptions about the unobserved risk premium and user costs terms. Reductions in σ and increases in π e both increase P (i.e., reduce R/P) and increase the sensitivity of house prices to the interest rate. For example, with σ = 0 and i = 6%, an increase in the expected rate of real appreciation from zero to 3% would double the impact of a change in the interest rate.
A dynamic user cost model
Given that expected house price appreciation increases house prices through its effect on UC, it is tempting to think of any increase in expected appreciation as a bubble. This conclusion is unwarranted, however, as nonzero rates of expected appreciation can arise naturally in the context of a dynamic user cost model. A simple version of such a model, similar to that presented in Poterba (1984) , consists of three equations:
. 
where H is the housing stock, P is the price of housing, R is rent, C is the marginal cost of new houses, i is the nominal interest rate, and δ is the rate of depreciation. Equation 4 represents the flow supply of new houses, and the function g satisfies g (·) > 0 and g (·) < 0. The marginal cost of new housing, C(H), increases with H, so C (·) > 0. Equation 5 represents the demand for housing, and the f satisfies f (H) < 0; ε is a housing demand shock. Equation 6 is the user cost relationship, equation 1, simplified by the omission of the income and property tax rates.
Assuming perfect foresight, the model is readily analyzed using a phase diagram involving P and H, as shown in figure 1a . Equation 4 determinesḢ, and setting this to zero yields theḢ = 0 locus. Combining equations 5 and 6 gives an expression forṖ, and setting this to zero results in thė P = 0 locus. The model exhibits familiar saddle path dynamics. An essential property is that when P is "too high" -meaning above theṖ = 0 locus -P is rising. This may be counterintuitive, but it follows directly from equation 6: starting from a P that satisfiesṖ = 0, increasing P reduces the rent-to-price ratio, R/P. The user cost must fall so that households are indifferent between renting and owning. Given i and δ , this can only happen through an increase in expected appreciation.
The model delivers two insights relevant for understanding the link between interest rates and house prices. One is that with zero expected appreciation, the static user cost relationship, equation
1, applies only to the steady state. Increases in housing demand or the interest rate will shift thė P = 0 locus upward, as shown in figure 1b, and house prices will adjust as the economy moves to its new steady state. Expected appreciations and depreciations are therefore part of the normal adjustment process, and do not necessarily imply the existence of bubbles.
A second insight is that interest rate changes cause house prices to overshoot the steady state.
The unanticipated rate reduction depicted in figure 1b , for example, leads to an immediate jump in house prices (from point A to point B in the diagram), followed by a subsequent decline (from point B to point C). The initial impact of interest rate changes therefore may exceed what is implied by the simple user cost model presented in the previous section.
The credit channel
The stylized user cost framework clearly leaves out a number of other factors that could potentially affect house prices, and alter prices' interest rate sensitivity. An obvious omission is the supply of credit: purchasing a house typically requires a loan, and many households are to some extent constrained in terms of the amount they can borrow. While not an explicit part of the framework, the user cost model is useful for thinking about how this might work. Because borrowing constrained households face a higher shadow cost of credit, the interest rate that appears in these households' version of equation 6 exceeds the market interest rate, i. An increase in the availability of credit, and the relaxation of borrowing constraints, would reduce this shadow cost. The effects would therefore be similar to those from an interest rate reduction. This is a natural interpretation of the development of the subprime mortgage market in the U.S., and a plausible story for why that market's development was associated with a house price boom. In this interpretation, the price rise would have been the result of a change in fundamentals, rather than a bubble.
To the extent that expansionary monetary policy relaxes credit constraints, an operative credit channel would tend to amplify the effects of monetary policy on house prices. According to this view, a monetary expansion has two effects. The first is to lower the mortgage rate. And second, by easing the availability of credit, the expansion would also increase the demand for owner-occupied housing by more than would be implied by the interest rate reduction alone. TheṖ locus would shift up by a larger amount, amplifying the appreciation.
The risk taking channel
The risk taking channel is a third mechanism through which monetary policy could affect house prices. According to this view, which has been articulated by Rajan (2005) , Borio & Zhu (2008) and Gambacorta (2009) would boost the price of risky assets by a larger amount than they would otherwise have risen.
The risk-taking channel maps only loosely into the user cost framework. One interpretation parallels the credit channel. The increased appetite for risk brought forth by low interest rates would make intermediaries more willing to lend, increasing credit supply. The increased availability of credit would allow some credit-constrained households to purchase homes, thus increasing the demand for owner-occupied houses and, assuming imperfect substitutability between the two types of dwellings, decreasing the rent-to-price ratio. An alternative interpretation is that low interest rates somehow reduce σ , the risk premium associated with home ownership. The positive impact of such a reduction on house prices would be the same an increase in expected home price appreciation. Neither interpretation implies a bubble.
Evidence on the response of house prices to interest rates
This section summarizes the existing literature on the impact of interest rates on house prices, and presents some new evidence on the relationship between user cost and house prices in the U.S. from a simple error correction model. Collectively, the results are consistent with an inverse relationship between house prices and interest rates, but in quantitative terms the effect is modest:
it is considerably weaker than implied by the user cost framework, and insufficient to explain the magnitude of most countries' real estate booms.
Existing literature
The cyclical properties of house prices and interest rates are well documented. Claessens et al.
(2011), for example, showed that house prices are strongly procyclical in most countries. Ahearne et al. (2005) found that low interest rates tend to precede housing price peaks, with a lead of approximately one to three years. While these patterns are suggestive, discerning the impact of interest rates per se is complicated by the fact that other macroeconomic factors affecting the demand for housing are varying along with the interest rate. Moreover, it is impossible to tell from purely descriptive analysis whether the magnitude of the house price variations are consistent with the effects implied by user cost theory.
Some indirect evidence on the contribution of interest rates to house price fluctuations was furnished by Campbell et al. (2009) . Using the methodology developed in Campbell (1991) , the authors decomposed house price fluctuations in 23 metropolitan areas in the U.S. into components attributable to real interest rates, rent, and risk premia. They found that risk premia were the principal source of variance in U.S. house prices, and that interest rate fluctuations accounted for a relatively small share.
Another piece of evidence on interest rates' contribution to house prices, and in particular the 2005. The variables included in the system were the house price, total reserves, CPI inflation, GDP growth, the 30-year mortgage rate, and the Federal funds rate. Monetary shocks were identified using sign restrictions, and a novel feature of the analysis is its incorporation of a latent house price revealed Granger-causal relationships between many of the variables, and in particular a causal relationship from interest rates to house prices and credit growth. While resisting the temptation to attach structural interpretations to the shocks, they found that a 25 basis point orthogonalized expansionary interest rate innovation leads to a statistically significant 0.8% increase in house prices. In terms of magnitude, this is very similar to the 0.9% response reported by Del Negro & Otrok (2007) , but the dynamics are very different. In Goodhart & Hofmann (2008) , there is no immediate impact: the effect builds slowly, reaching 0.4% after 10 quarters and gradually achieving its maximum after 40 quarters. In Del Negro & Otrok (2007) , on the other hand, the 0.9% peak occurs immediately and dissipates rapidly. Jarociński & Smets (2008) presented two sets of estimates from Bayesian VARs for the U.S.:
one in levels, and an alternative first-difference specification. Their nine-variable models included output, consumption, the GDP deflator, housing investment, the house price, the short-term interest rate, the term spread, a commodity price index, and the money supply. Like Del Negro & Otrok (2007) , they identified structural shocks via sign restrictions on the impulse response functions.
In the levels VAR, an expansionary 25 basis point monetary policy shock leads to a gradual rise in house prices, peaking at a statistically significant 0.5% after ten quarters. This is accompanied by a decline in the long-term interest rate of roughly 10 basis points. The effects subsequently diminish, and 20 quarters after the shock the house price has returned to its mean. The differenced VAR yielded somewhat larger and more persistent estimates, but the confidence intervals are much wider, especially at longer horizons.
Finally, a recent paper by Sá et al. (2011) reported panel VAR results for 18 OECD countries from a 12-variable model, using data from 1984 through 2006. In addition to the standard macro variables (output, the price level, consumption, non-residential and residential investment, shortand long-term interest rates, and a measure of credit), the specification also included four variables reflecting global factors: world GDP, world prices, the trade-weighted exchange rate, and the current account balance. Like Del Negro & Otrok (2007) and Jarociński & Smets (2008) , the shocks were identified using sign restrictions. The results are remarkably similar to those of Jarociński & Smets (2008) : the response to a 25 basis expansionary shock is initially slightly negative, subsequently rising to a statistically significant but modest 0.3% effect after 10 quarters. Over a similar horizon, the long-term interest rate declines by approximately 10 basis points. Interestingly, the response is somewhat larger for countries with more sophisticated financial systems (including the U.S.), where the response at ten quarters is closer to 0.5%. For all countries, the effect subsequently diminishes, falling to 0.1% after 30 quarters.
These VAR-based estimates are remarkably similar to those reported by Glaeser et al. (2010) , who used a completely different econometric method. Running a simple regression of the log house price on the real 10-year interest rate, they concluded that a 10 basis point reduction in the interest rate would result in a 0.7% rise in house prices.
Because it is specified in terms of the long-term interest rate rather than the short-term policy rate, mapping the Glaeser et al. All of these effects are quite modest in economic terms, and considerably smaller than the effects implied by standard theory. As discussed above in section 2.1, the user cost model suggests that a 10 basis point reduction in the long-term interest rate, the magnitude typically associated with a 25 basis point expansionary monetary policy shock, should cause house prices to rise by 1.3% to 1.6%, depending on the initial level of interest rates. By contrast, the VAR estimates, which range from 0.3% to 0.8%, are one-fourth to one-half the magnitude implied by the user cost model.
Results from an error-correction model
While the structural VAR exercises summarized above paid careful attention to the identification of monetary policy shocks, they failed to incorporate the main features of the user cost model sketched in section 2.1. If the real UC and expected rate of real appreciation are stationary, equation 1 says that the rent-to-price ratio should also be stationary. Including rent in the model could therefore be useful for understanding why macro variables affect the property market, and for determining whether the observed house price response is excessive relative to the user cost benchmark. This section presents the results from a simple error-correction model of house prices that represents a first step in this direction.
But before developing such an error-correction model, one first has to verify that rents and house prices are indeed cointegrated. As reported in Kuttner (2011b) , standard augmented Dicky- (1, −1) on the house price and rent variables, and ensuring that the rent-to-price ratio reverts to a constant mean. Consistent with the cointegration results, the error correction term is significant in the price (but not the rent) equation; and UC has a negative, statistically significant effect on the house price.
The most interesting results from the standpoint of this paper have to do with the way in which house prices and rents react to changes in UC. Figure 2 plots the responses to a 10 basis point negative real UC innovation: house prices gradually increase, with a maximum response of roughly 0.35% at 12 quarters. 4 The effect subsequently diminishes, and by 30 quarters the effects have dissipated. The effect on rent is trivial.
Although it uses a very different econometric specification, these results are comparable to (but on the low end of) those based the VAR approach. Taken together, the available evidence points to a modest effect of interest rates on property prices. There is therefore no evidence that house prices overreact to interest rates, relative to the user cost benchmark. Rather, these results collectively raise the question of why house prices should be so insensitive to interest rates. 5
Interest rates and the property price boom of the mid-2000s
Turning from the time series evidence on the effects of interest rates on property prices, this section focuses in on the behavior of the housing market during the previous decade's boom. One objective is to evaluate informally the plausibility of low interest rates as a cause of significant house price appreciation in the U.S. The second is to determine whether differences in interest rates can explain why the housing boom was large in some countries, but small in others. 4 The standard choleski decomposition is used, with UC ordered last. The effect of the UC shock is roughly onethird smaller when UC is ordered first.
The U.S. experience
5 Glaeser et al. (2010) showed that the option to refinance, plus labor mobility, reduces the interest rate sensitivity by roughly one-half. 6 Other house price measures, including the FHFA and Case-Shiller indexes, exhibited similar behavior. 
A cross-country exploration
From a global perspective, two observations about the recent real estate boom and bust stand out.
First, the boom was a global phenomenon: most countries experienced rapidly rising real estate prices during the early and middle part of the last decade. The second observation is that the degree of appreciation varied widely across countries. This is vividly illustrated in figure 4 , which plots real house prices for six countries: Estonia, Iceland, the U.S., the U.K., Korea, and Portugal, a set of countries chosen to emphasize the wide variation in the size of the boom. Estonia takes the prize for the most spectacular bubble, with real house prices in that country increasing by a factor of nearly 2.4 between the fourth quarter of 2003 and the second quarter of 2007. In comparison with Estonia, Iceland's 60% appreciation seems restrained. Both countries' booms dwarf those of the U.S. and the U.K., which experienced real house price appreciation over a comparable period of 17% and 28% respectively. 7 House prices barely appreciated at all in Korea, and actually fell slightly in Portugal.
Some of the cross country differences may be due to discrepancies in the definition and con-struction of the series. Some control for changes in composition (e.g., the repeat sales FMHPI index in the U.S.) whereas others do not. Moreover, some are national averages, while others, like
Iceland's, are specific to the capital city. (Details on the house price series used can be found in the appendix.) It is unlikely that differences in data construction can account for the extreme range of outcomes across countries, however.
A variety of country-and region-specific factors surely account for much of this diversity.
But in light of concerns about interest rates' putative contribution to property price bubbles, an important question is the extent to which differences in interest rates across countries are in any way related to the relative sizes of the booms. If low interest rates inflate house prices, then one would expect those countries with lower rates to have experienced more appreciation. And more broadly, if low interest rates were also associated with more relaxed lending standards and greater credit supply, as suggested by the credit and risk-taking channels, then low rates would also give rise to rapid credit growth.
Analogous questions have been examined empirically using the VAR approach surveyed in section 3.1. Those studies' emphasis was on the comovements over time between interest rates, credit, and house prices, however, rather on cross-country differences in the average rates of appreciation that are the focus of this section. 8 Here, the aim is to determine the extent to which the prevailing level of real interest rates were an important determinant of the booms' relative sizes.
Perhaps the most difficult part of this exercise is obtaining usable property price data. The primary source of the data used in this analysis is the dataset compiled by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). One problem is that many countries, especially transition and emerging market economies, have only recently begun collecting property price data, which severely constrains the time series dimension of the analysis. In the end, property price data from 2003Q4 onward were available for only 36 countries. Details on data sources and definitions can be found in the appendix.
Another problem is, as noted earlier, that there is no standard methodology for constructing house price indexes. It therefore goes without saying that the property price levels are not directly comparable across countries. One has to assume that it is possible to make meaningful comparisons of the growth rates calculated from these series. Methodological differences will surely introduce country-specific measurement error, but since property price growth will be used as the dependent variable in the regressions, the additional noise would increase the regression standard error, but not bias the parameter estimates.
Finding data on housing-related credit presents another challenge. This paper relies on data are similarly varied. The modal growth rates are in the 1-3% range (indicating that housing credit grew 1-3% more rapidly than GDP), but the rate exceeded 3% in a sizable minority of the countries in the sample.
As shown in the top panel of figure 6 , while relatively low, ex post real short-term interest rates 5"6 6"7"9 9"7"; ;"7"E E"7"< :"< did not vary much across countries. Most fall in the 0-2.5% range, with a few below zero and some exceeding 2.5%. Real lending rates, shown in the bottom panel, tended to be higher, and most fall into the 2.5-5% range. Some are lower, but still positive, and a few exceed 5%. The relatively low dispersion of interest rates alone suggests that they are unlikely to explain much of the crosscountry variation in house price appreciation: property prices would have to be extraordinarily interest sensitive for changes of one or two percentage points to account for the wildly differing rates of house price appreciation plotted in figure 5 .
A cross-sectional regression model will be used to evaluate the relationship between monetary conditions and the housing market,
where the dependent variable Y represents either the real property price gain or the growth in housing credit. The regressors are r S , the average real short-term interest rate; r L , the average real lending rate; and %∆MB, the annualized average change in the real monetary base. All changes are The inclusion of the monetary base term requires some explanation. Strictly speaking, the user cost model has no place for monetary quantities, since in the steady state house prices should be determined solely by rents and interest rates (plus taxes, depreciation, and the risk premium).
However in some countries, base money may serve as a proxy for credit conditions, loosely defined.
A central bank targeting a short-term interest may find itself in a position of having to accommodate increased credit demand by allowing an expansion in the base, for example. Alternatively, in countries with actively managed exchange rates, base growth may be associated with unsterilized capital inflows. Either way, the base may convey some information about the availability of bank credit beyond that contained in the short-term and lending interest rates.
Many aspects of this regression are problematic, of course. It would be hard to argue that any of the regressors are exogenous. Since it includes the effects of omitted variables, such as GDP, that affect property prices and housing credit, these omitted variables' effects will be subsumed into the only weak evidence of an interest rate effect. Neither of the two interest rate coefficients is statistically significant, nor are they jointly significant. The coefficient on the lending rate does have the correct sign, however, and with a p-value of 0.11 it is almost significant at the 10% level. Indeed, if the short-term interest rate is dropped, as in the second column of the table, the coefficient on the lending rate becomes significant at the 5% level. Even so, the parameter estimate of roughly −1 implies a relatively modest effect: a 1 percentage point increase in the real long-term interest rate is associated with a 1 percentage point reduction in the annualized real rate of house price appreciation. During normal periods with stable property prices, this would represent a sizable effect.
And taking the estimate at face value, one could point out that a one percentage point increase in the lending rate in the U.S. would have significantly reduced the annualized growth rate of house prices from 3.4% to 2.4%. But for countries experiencing double-digit annual growth rates, such as Estonia and Iceland, a change in the lending rate of a percentage point or two would not have made a tangible difference.
Interestingly, the coefficient on the monetary base is highly statistically significant, with a 1 percentage point increase in the rate of base growth implying a 0.35% increase in house prices.
This may seem like a relatively small effect, and, for those countries with modest rates of real base growth, it is. But a significant number of countries experienced spectacular real base growth during this period, including: Iceland (35%), New Zealand (31%), Ireland (26%), Slovenia (24%), Russia (18%), Estonia (15%) and Latvia (12%). For these countries, the estimated coefficient on the base growth variable implies quite large effects on property prices. These extreme observations stand out in figure 7 , which plots real house price growth against real base growth, illustrating how rapid base growth was in some countries accompanied by pronounced house price appreciations.
The third column of table 2 shows an analogous set of estimates for the regression with housing credit growth (expressed as the percentage point change in the share of housing credit relative to GDP) as the dependent variable. Here, the lending rate is individually significant at the 5% level, and the two interest rates are also jointly significant at that level. The −0.43 parameter estimate says that a 1 percentage point increase in the real lending rate is associated in a 0.43 percentage point reduction in credit growth. The effect is not large, but with annualized credit growth rates in the 0 to 4% range, a 1 or 2 percentage point change in the lending rate would make a noticeable difference.
As in the interest rate regression, the monetary base is highly significant. The point estimate of 0.17 says that a 1 percentage point increase in base growth would translate into a 0.17 percentage point increase in credit growth. This would not have been a major contributor to credit growth for those countries with modest rates of base growth. But as with property prices, double-digit growth in the monetary base in some countries seems to have been associated with sizable increases in housing-related credit.
Conclusions
This paper's main conclusions are twofold. The first is that all available evidence -existing studies, plus the new findings presented above -points to a rather small effect of interest rates on housing prices. VAR-based estimates of the effect of a 25 basis point expansionary monetary policy shock range from 0.3% to 0.9%, both in the U.S. and in other industrialized countries.
These estimates are broadly consistent with results from other methodologies, including simple OLS regressions and error-correction models. They are also considerably smaller than the effects implied by the standard user cost model. Moreover, they are too small to explain the previous decade's tremendous real estate boom in the U.S. and elsewhere.
This is not to say that low interest rates had nothing to do the real estate boom. would not follow from that alone that low interest rates caused bubbles. In the context of standard theory, the interest rate, along with rents and tax rates, is a fundamental determinant of valuations.
Making the case that low interest rates cause bubbles would require showing that house prices tend to overreact to rate reductions. Although the previous decade's house price boom was out of proportion to the interest rate decline, there is no evidence that this happens systematically. The puzzle is why house prices are less sensitive to interest rates than theory says they should be, not more so.
Still lacking is an explanation of why low interest rates sometimes seem to be associated with bubbles, and sometimes not. The user cost model may contain a clue. As noted earlier, the expected rate of house price appreciation is an important if unobserved ingredient in user cost. As such, it is a deus ex machina capable of explaining any level of house prices. But it also suggests that the interest sensitivity of house prices depends on the expected rate of appreciation, since the interest semi-elasticity is inversely proportional to user cost. Consequently, in an environment of rapidly rising house prices, interest rate reductions may have a larger effect than when prices are stable.
Low interest rates may fan the flames, even if they do not start the fire.
The evidence presented in this paper also suggests that credit conditions, broadly defined, may play a larger role in house price booms than low interest rates per se. In market-oriented financial systems, like that of the U.S., a loosening of credit conditions plausibly resulted from financial innovation, such as securitization, and a relaxation of lending standards. In more bank-centric financial systems, like those present in many emerging market and transition economies, loose credit conditions have been associated with the rapid increase of quantitative monetary indicators, such as the monetary base. This suggests that it would be a mistake to focus narrowly on interest rates as the cause of asset price bubbles.
Data appendix
The following table lists the countries included in the analysis, details on the property price data, and the data used for the regressions reported in 
